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RECENT CASES
sequences may be unfortunate. Since this note was prepared, a limit on the appropri-
ation power has been for the first time authoritatively announced; but the scope of the
remaining power is not yet clear. U.S. v. Butler, 296 U.S-Chicago Daily Tribune,
Jan. 7, E936, p. 6.
Contracts-Consideration-Uniform Written Obligations Act-[Pennsylvania].-
Assumpsit was brought on a note, signed by the defendant, which began with a prom-
ise to pay the plaintiff $5,000, was followed by a pledge of collateral security, and con-
cluded with the words "and should any balance remain unpaid, I [defendant] further
promise and agree to pay the same to the holder thereof on demand." The note was
not sealed. The defendant contended that because no consideration was averred, the
plaintiff did not establish a good cause of action. Held, the Uniform Written Obliga-
tions Act (Pa. P.L. 985 (1927)) eliminates the defense of absence of consideration
where the right of action is based on a written promise which contains an additional
express statement, in any form or language, that the signer intends to be legally bound.
Here, the express promise to pay was followed by another promise to pay any unpaid
balance. Gilmore, ex'lrx. v. Kessler, 22 Pa. Dist & County. Rep. 274 (1935).
For discussion of the Uniform Written Obligations Act see note, Contracts without
Consideration, ante, p. 312.
Corporate Reorganization-A Foreclosure Receivership as a "Proceeding in Equity
Receivership" within the Meaning of § 77B-[Federal].-A petition was filed for in-
voluntary reorganization proceedings under § 77B(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, the peti-
tioner alleging that a receiver had been appointed in a pending mortgage foreclosure
action which involved all of the debtor's property. Held, petition dismissed; a fore-
closure receivership is not a pending equity receivership within the meaning of the
Bankruptcy Act. IZ re 2168 Broadway Corp., 78 F. (2d) 678 (C.C.A. 2d 1935), cert.
granted, sub nora. Duparquet Huot Moneuse Co. v. Frysinger, Evans et al., 56 Sup. Ct. 248
(1935).
By the terms of § 77B, subdivision (a), three creditors having a combined claim of
$1ooo or more in excess of their securities, may file an involuntary petition for reor-
ganization of a corporation. Their petition must allege, inter alia, that the debtor has
committed an act of bankruptcy within the four preceding months or that a prior pro-
ceeding in bankruptcy or equity receivership is pending. Exactly what is meant by a
"proceeding in equity receivership" has been the subject of sharp controversy. The
expression "equity receivership" is broad enough to include all cases in which a re-
ceiver is appointed by a court of equity for any purpose whatsoever. i Clark, Receiv-
ers § 1:2 (2d ed. 1929). Influenced by this consideration the federal courts in the sev-
enth circuit have held it to include a receivership in a mortgage foreclosure. In re
Granada Hotel Corp., 9 F. Supp. 909 (D.C. Ill. 1934), affirmed in 78 F. (2d) 409 (C.C.A.
7 th 1935), cert. granted, sub norn. Tuttle v. Harris, 56 Sup. Ct. x5o (1935); In re Fla-
iningo Hotel Corp., i Corp. Reorg. Mag. 53 (D.C. Ill. 1934); In re Surf Bldg. Corp., 3i
F. Supp. 295 (D.C. Ill. r934). In all of these cases the mortgage covered all or nearly
all of the assets. See Spaeth and Friedberg, Early Developments under Section 77B,
30 Ill. L. Rev. 137, 139, note 6 (x935). Cf. Hanna, Corporate Reorganization under
the Bankruptcy Act, 21 Am. B. Ass'n J. 73, 76 (1935). Among lawyers, however, the
phrase "proceeding in equity receivership," is probably regarded as referring to the
